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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Models positing a homogeneous population of rational agents often fail to explain data
generated by controlled laboratory experiments. This point has been made in dramatic
fashion by Nagel (1995), Stahl and Wilson (1995), Ho, Camerer and Weigelt (1998), Bosch-
Domenech, Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2002), Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), and
many others following their lead (for an up to date survey of the literature see Crawford,
Costa-Gomes and Iriberri (2010)). These models assume the existence of a set of players
that are heterogeneous in their levels of rationality.
In this paper we view a person’s cognitive level as endogenously determined by his ex-
pectations about the (also endogenously determined) cognitive levels of others.1 We use a
controlled laboratory experiment to show that observed level of play is a function of how
sophisticated a player believes his opponents to be. We study the 2/3 guessing game, as
discussed by Nagel (1995). In this game, a cognitive hierarchy model typically assumes
that level zero agents choose randomly. Level one agents best respond to level zeros. More
generally, agents who are level k are either assumed to believe all other players are of level
k − 1 and best respond to them (as in Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1995)), or are
assumed to best respond to a belief on the distribution of lower levels in the population (as in
Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004)). Therefore, the choice of a participant in the 2/3 guessing
game, which we can observe and call the “observed cognitive level,” depends on the following
three elements: (1) the subject’s beliefs about level zero play; (2) the subject’s expectation
about the cognitive levels of other players; and (3) the number of steps of reasoning that the
subject is capable of in the context of the game.
We will refer to the last element as an agent’s “objective cognitive level.” In other words,
the objective cognitive level is an upper bound on what someone is capable of acting like. If
1Theoretically, the only model that we are aware of that has endogenous choice of cognitive levels is Choi
(2006) who posits that agents differ by the cognitive costs they have in functioning at different rationality
levels. As a result, while agents cannot act as if they were smarter than they actually are, they can choose
to behave in various ways depending on their comparison between the marginal benefit and marginal cost of
increasing their rationality level.
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one could look inside each person’s brain one could, in principal, measure how many levels
each person is capable of and construct this objective level distribution. However, when the
game is actually played, people may choose to behave as a lower level player if they believe
that others in their group are distributed in a manner different from the objective distri-
bution, for example if the objective distribution stochastically dominates their subjective
guess of it. Therefore, the observed level distribution might differ from the objective level
distribution.2
The goal of this paper is to illustrate the difference between the objective and the ob-
served level distributions using a number of manipulations regarding the expectations about
the cognitive levels of other players. We start by having undergraduate students play the 2/3
guessing game against a group of graduate students who have training in these sorts of games
(“Graduate” treatment). In this treatment, if undergraduates believe that trained graduate
students’ levels of cognition in this task are higher than the average of their peers, they
should exhibit higher cognitive levels when playing against the former than when playing
against the latter. This is precisely what we observe: relative to the “Control” treatment, in
which undergraduate students are playing against each other, we observe a significant shift
in the distribution of cognitive levels towards more sophisticated behavior when undergrad-
uate students are playing against graduate students. That is, the distribution of choices
in the Graduate treatment is closer to the objective level distribution compared with the
distribution of choices in the Control treatment. We then ask (different) students to play
against a set of computers who play uniformly on the support. The subjects are aware of
the strategy the computers follow. In this treatment (the “Computer” treatment) students
are now essentially playing only against level zero agents. Relative to the Control treatment,
we observe a shift towards less sophisticated behavior.
Our main contribution is that we control beliefs and highlight the role that they play in
the 2/3 guessing game. We show that subjects may behave differently depending on their
2The idea that one’s behavior depends on both his own cognitive level as well as his expectations on
the cognitive levels of others is explored theoretically by Strzalecki (2010) who studies the Email Game and
shows that coordination can be achieved in a finite number of steps.
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beliefs regarding the sophistication of other players. In other words, we demonstrate the
difference between the observed and objective cognitive level of subjects by manipulating
(and thus controlling) beliefs about their opponents. Since experience is held fixed, the
difference in behavior is entirely attributable to the differences in beliefs. Overall, our results
show that in at least some strategic situations, subjects do not necessarily function at their
highest cognitive level but rather are poised to if they believe that others will do so. This
behavior describes almost half of the population.3
As a by-product of our design, we are able to accomplish a second goal which is to
measure, in a clean and precise manner, the fraction of people who are capable of at least
one step of reasoning (strategic players). Indeed, in all other papers the identification of
strategic types (i.e., types above zero) is confounded by the fact that the behavior of subjects
is a function of both their objective cognitive levels and their beliefs about others. This is in
sharp contrast with our Computer Treatment where we completely control for these beliefs:
all subjects capable of at least one step of reasoning should behave as level 1 players. Thus,
we can clearly identify those who are capable of at least one step of reasoning. While the
fraction of subjects capable of at least one step of reasoning is stable across treatments
(about 50%), as we move across treatments from the Computer to the Control and finally
to the Graduate treatment, we observe a redistribution of types to higher levels. In other
words, as we move across treatments, our results suggest that some of those acting as level
1 reasoners in the Computer treatment would behave as level 2s or more in the Control or
Graduate treatment.
3Although the focus is different, there are a limited number of papers that we are aware of that control
for the beliefs of the subjects in some way. Coricelli and Nagel (2009) use fMRI to measure brain activity
when subjects participated in the 2/3 guessing game in order to differentiate between subjects making
random choices and those making choices resulting from higher levels of reasoning. Our results align with
theirs in that some subjects differentiated their behavior in the human compared with computer treatment,
in which computers chose numbers randomly. Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) study the two-person
guessing game in which they train subjects subjects and show that when these trained subjects are paired
with computers playing a known strategy they exhibit behavior consistent with Level-k theory. Using the
two-person centipede game with repeated rounds, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2011) show that when players
of differing cognitive abilities are faced with each other, they converge to the equilibrium at different rates.
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The Control, Graduate and Computer treatments use a between subjects design. To
assess the robustness of our results regarding the manipulation of subjects’ beliefs, we also
conduct a experiment with a within-subject design (“Combo” treatment). In the Combo
treatment, we use the strategy method to obtain subjects’ choices in 8 different 2/3 guessing
games. In each game the undergraduate students are playing against a group which consists
of a combination of computers and graduate students. The groups range from 7 computers
and 0 graduate students ((7c, 0g) configuration) as in the Computer treatment, to 0 com-
puters and 7 graduate students ((0c, 7g) configuration), as in the Graduate treatment. We
start by showing that the choices from the (7c, 0g) configuration in the Combo treatment
match the choices from our Computer treatment. There is also no statistical difference be-
tween the answers from the (0c, 7g) configuration in the Combo treatment and the choices
in the Graduate student treatment. This suggests that the strategy method did not have
an impact on the behavior of the subjects. This treatment further allows us to observe and
follow the behavior of the same subjects when their beliefs about the population they are
playing against change. Finally, because subjects submit all their choices at the same time,
their choices in the different configurations of the group are not influenced by experience in
the 2/3 game. While a little more than half of the population seems to play randomly, the
rest climb the cognitive hierarchy ladder because they believe that others are climbing it as
well and they must keep up with them (best respond).
Our paper contributes to the literature that investigates the behavior of individuals in
strategic one-shot games, using the guessing game as a case study. Recent research has lead
to several breakthroughs in understanding the discrepancy between predicted equilibrium
behavior and behavior observed in experiments. For example, Costa-Gomes and Crawford
(2006) conducted a series of 16 two-person guessing games using MouseLab to show that
for a significant fraction of the population, deviations from equilibrium can be attributed to
how subjects model others’ decisions, and that level-k models can explain those responses.
Burchardi and Penczynski (2010) design an experiment in which players are divided into
teams. Each member is allowed to pass both his/her individually preferred choice and a
persuasive message to his/her partner concerning how best to play the game. The authors
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then classify these verbal arguments according to levels of strategic sophistication. Agranov,
Caplin and Tergiman (2010) introduce a novel experimental technique that allows them to
record the intermediate choices of subjects in the 2/3 guessing game in the three minute
period immediately after the structure of the game has been conveyed to them. The authors
find that average choices decrease over time indicating an increase in strategic sophistication,
and that level 0 behavior matches well the standard assumptions of level-k models. Coricelli
and Nagel (2009) use fMRI to study the differences in the neurological responses of players
with different levels of strategic sophistication. Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) focus on bounded
rationality to explain the failure to play the equilibrium strategy in the 2/3 guessing game.
The authors use a two-person 2/3 guessing game in which the weakly dominant strategy
is to play zero regardless of the belief one holds about the choice of the other player. The
authors found that even in this circumstance, in early rounds of the game, the majority of
people choose numbers above zero.
Separate studies have shown that choices in the 2/3 guessing game vary either with
repeated play or with subject pools. For example, Weber (2003) has subjects play a series of
2/3 guessing games without feedback. The author shows that subjects’ choices decrease over
time. Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) summarize a series of experiments that use separate
pools of subjects (CEO’s, portfolio managers, Caltech board, game theorists, university
students and high school students) and show that choices in the guessing game vary with
these subject pools. However, in these papers, subjects’ choices can be influenced by several
factors. Indeed, in Weber (2003) the change of choices can come from learning the structure of
the game or the belief by players that other players’ choices will go down. In the experiments
that Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) survey, the difference in the distribution of choices can
come from the difference in a subject’s own objective cognitive level or his/her beliefs about
the objective levels of his/her opponents. Neither of these previous studies highlight the role
of beliefs, which is the main point of our paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the experimental
procedure and design. In Section 3 we analyze the experimental results. The conclusions
are in section 4.
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2 Experimental Design
The experiments were conducted in classrooms of undergraduate students at New York
University and at the University of British Columbia.4 In total, 359 students participated in
these experiments. We conducted four treatments: the Control treatment (91 participants),
the Graduate treatment (99 participants), the Computer treatment (85 participants) and
the Combo treatment (54 participants).The experimental procedure was as follows. At the
beginning of a class lecture, we distributed the instructions of the experiment, read those
instructions out loud and asked students to write their number (or numbers for the Combo
treatment) on a piece of paper, which they put in an envelope. We collected the envelopes
and calculated the payoffs of the participants while they were attending the rest of their
lecture. At the end of it, we distributed the envelopes back to the students: those who
won in this experiment had $10 cash in their envelopes, the other participants had nothing.
That way we ensured that the identity of the winners remained anonymous. In the Combo
treatment students submitted several numbers, each corresponding to their choice for a
different configuration of the group they were playing with. We then drew at random one
configuration and paid them according to the number they chose for that case.
All the experiments lasted less than 10 minutes in total, including reading the instruc-
tions.
In the Control treatment, our subjects played against each other in groups of size 8.
We compare the data from the Control treatment to the other experiments reported in the
literature. They also serve as the baseline for comparison with the Graduate and Computer
treatments. Subjects were given the following instructions:
“Choose a number between 0 and 100. You will be put into groups of 8 people. The
winner is the person whose number is closest to 2/3 times the average of all chosen
4The UBC students played in the Combo treatment. The NYU students played the Control, Graduate
and Computer treatments. See footnote 18 in Result 5 of Section 3 for evidence that the behavior of NYU
and UBC students did not significantly differ.
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numbers of the people in your group. The winner gets a fixed prize of $10. In case of
a tie the prize is split among those who tie.”
Our first manipulation (the Graduate treatment) aims to provide participants with
enough incentives to think as hard as they can about the game being played and behave
closer to their objective cognitive levels. To achieve this we first conducted a 2/3 guessing
game with a group of 8 graduate students from the department of economics at NYU using
the instructions from our Control treatment. We then conducted a 2/3 guessing game exper-
iment in which undergraduate students were playing against 7 of the 8 graduate student that
completed the game before (so that that the group size remained at 8). The undergraduate
subjects received the following instructions:
“Choose a number between 0 and 100. You will win $10 if your chosen number
is closest to two thirds times the average of all chosen numbers of the people in
your group.
Your group: 8 graduate students in the Department of Economics, who have training
in these types of games, played this game a few days ago. You will replace one of them.
So your group is YOU and 7 of those graduate students.
You will win $10 if your chosen number is closest to 2/3 times the average of all chosen
numbers (yours and 7 graduate students). In case of a tie the prize is split. Notice you
are not playing against people in this room. Each of you is playing against 7 graduate
students. So, all of you may earn $10 and none of you may.”
The goal of our second manipulation (the Computer treatment) was to shift the beliefs
about the other players in the opposite direction. In this treatment, an independent group
of undergraduate students played against seven computers who chose randomly between 0
and 100. The instructions for this experiment were:
“Choose a number between 0 and 100. You will win $10 if your chosen number
is closest to two thirds times the average of all chosen numbers of the people in
your group.
8
Your group: Your group consists of you and 7 computers. Each of those comput-
ers will choose a random number between 0 and 100, each number being equally
likely. So your group is YOU and 7 computers.
You will win $10 if your chosen number is closest to 2/3 times the average of
the numbers in your group (yours and the 7 random numbers chosen by the
computers). Notice you are not playing against people in this room. Each of
you is playing against 7 computers. So, all of you may earn $10 and none of you
may.”
Computers are essentially playing a level zero strategy. In this treatment we expect all
subjects who are capable of at least one level of reasoning to choose numbers close to 32.5
Subjects who are capable of higher steps of reasoning will appear to be level one. Further,
this treatment provides us with a way to estimate how many participants are capable of at
least one level of reasoning, which we will be able to compare with the proportions in the
Control and the Graduate treatments.
Finally, we ran the Combo treatment in which we used the strategy method to elicit our
subjects’ choices for mixed groups. For each undergraduate subject, the group consisted of
himself, X computers and 7 − X graduate students randomly taken from the set of eight
graduate students that played the game before, where X took the values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and
7. In other words, instead of facing seven computers (as in the Computer treatment) or seven
graduate students (as in the Graduate treatment), students in the Combo treatment faced
a mixture of those two populations. For each specified parameter X, we elicited the choices
of the subjects.6 At the end of the experiment, we randomly chose one of the configurations
and students were paid based on the numbers they chose in that configuration as well as
the numbers chosen by the computers and the graduate students.7 This treatment allows
5The best response to an average of x¯ if a subject’s number is counted in the average is 2(n−1)x¯3n−2 where n
is the total number of players in the group. In our case n = 8 and thus subject should choose 31.8.
6See Appendix A for the complete instructions for the Combo treatment.
7For example, if there were 3 graduate students in the configuration, we randomly chose 3 numbers from
those submitted by the graduate students.
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us to establish the connection between a subject’s observed cognitive level and his beliefs
about the cognitive level of his opponents, as those beliefs change from them having a low
cognitive level (as in the Computer treatment) to a them having a high cognitive level (as in
the Graduate treatment). Importantly, because we use a within subjects design, we can trace
the behavior of the same participant. Further, because subjects submit all their answers at
the same time, our subjects’ choices are not impacted by their experience.8
3 Results
Result 1: Behavior in the Control treatment is similar to the behavior reported
in other experimental studies of the 2/3 guessing game.
We start by comparing the results of our Control treatment with the results of other
experiments reported in the literature. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics from the
Control treatment and other studies. In Table 2 we report the distribution of cognitive levels
in the Control treatment according to Nagel (1995)9 and compare this distribution to Nagel’s
data.
It is clear from Tables 1 and 2 that the subjects in the Control treatment are very similar
to other studies in terms of the their chosen numbers as well as the distribution of cognitive
levels.
8We know that repeated play, with feedback (see Nagel (1995)) or without feedback (see Weber (2003))
can lead subjects to choose lower numbers over time.
9Nagel’s classification starts from the premise that Level 0 players choose 50. Nagel then constructs
neighborhood intervals of 50pn, where p is the multiplier used in the game (p = 23 in our case) and n
represents the level of reasoning (n = 0, 1, 2, ...). The numbers that fall between two neighborhood intervals
of 50pn+1 and 50pn are called interim intervals. To determine the boundaries of adjacent intervals a geometric
mean is used. Thus the neighborhood interval of 50pn have boundaries of 50pn+
1
4 and 50pn−
1
4 rounded to
the nearest integers. The exception is Level 0, which is truncated at 50. Nagel classifies as Level 0 choices
between 45 and 50, Level 1 those between 30 and 37, Level 2 between 20 and 25, and Level 3 those between
13 and 16.
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mean
choice
median
choice
st dev
group
size
Control treatment 35.1 33 21 8
Nagel (1995) 37.2 33 20 14− 16
Ho, Camerer and Weigelt (1998) 38.9 NA 24.7 7
Agranov, Caplin and Tergiman (2010) 36.4 33 20.2 8
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Control treatment.
Control Treatment Nagel’s data
Level 0 8% 7.5%
Level 1 25% 26%
Level 2 18% 24%
Level 3 8% 2%
Fraction captured by
Nagel’s classification
59% 59.5%
Table 2: Level classification according to Nagel (1995).
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The main hypothesis of this paper is that the observed distribution of cognitive levels
is endogenous and can be manipulated by varying the expectations about other players’s
cognitive levels. To test this hypothesis, we compare the choices of our subjects across the
Control, Computer and Graduate Student treatments. Our findings are presented in Result
2 below.
Result 2: The distribution of observed cognitive levels in the Graduate treatment
is shifted towards higher cognitive levels compared with the Control treatment.
The opposite is true in the Computer treatment. In addition, the proportion of
subjects capable of at least one level of reasoning is about one half.
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
F
r
a
c
t
io
n
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
choice
(a) Control
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
F
r
a
c
t
io
n
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
choice
(b) Graduate
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
F
r
a
c
t
io
n
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
choice
(c) Computer
Figure 1: Histograms of choices in the Control, Graduate and Computer Treatments.
12
In Figure 1 we present the histograms of choices in the Control, Graduate and Computer
treatments. In Tables 3 and 4 we present summary statistics of the choices observed in these
three treatments, and the distribution of cognitive levels in these treatments according to
the Nagel (1995) classification, respectively.10
Mean Choice Median Choice Std. dev. # Obs
Control Treatment 35.1 33 21.02 91
Graduate Treatment 28.6 27 18.93 99
Computer Treatment 34.3 33 14.07 85
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Control, Graduate and Computer treatments.
Control Graduate Computer
Level 0 8% 10% 9%
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level ∞
25%
18%
8%
0%
20%
20%
5%
10%
49%
Fraction captured by
Nagel’s classification
59% 65% 58%
Fraction not classified 41% 35% 42%
Table 4: Level classification of Nagel (1995) in the Control, Graduate and Computer treat-
ments.
Table 4 presents some interesting results. First, note that in the Computer treatment any
subject with an objective cognitive level of at least 1 should have an observed cognitive level
of exactly 1 and should choose (about) 32, since 32 is the best response to the computers
10Since all higher level reasoners should act as level 1 players in the Computer treatment, we cannot
separately identify them in Table 4: together they represent 49% of the population.
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choosing randomly. If we interpret Nagel’s classification strictly, however, many of those
choosing below that number would be classified as higher levels. This is actually a false
classification in our context since their choices indicate confusion and not sophistication:
any truly strategic subject would know that his best response to a set of computers is 32
and not something lower. For the other treatments, to find the number of subjects who are
level 1 or higher we must sum all of those classified as at least level 1 since by not controlling
their beliefs, lower choices can be rationalized. In the Computer, Graduate and Control
treatments the number of subjects classified as being level 1 or more is 49%, 55% and 51%,
respectively. A test of proportions indicates that these percentages are not different (all
pairwise p-values are greater than 10%).
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Figure 2: Histograms of choices in the Control, Graduate and Computer treatments, for
those who are level 1 and above.
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While the percentage of subjects who are classified as at least level 1 is similar across
these treatments, the distribution of types within these groups changes as we match our
subjects with more sophisticated opponents.As we can see from Figure 1, the distribution
of choices in the Graduate treatment is shifted to the left relative to the one in the Control
treatment. Note, for instance, that there are no subjects that chose numbers below 1 in the
Control treatment, while 10% of the population did so in the Graduate treatment. As a
result, the distribution of choices across treatments changes in the expected direction.
To demonstrate this first note that only individuals who have high objective cognitive
levels (level 1 or above) can be expected to react to a change in our treatments. Those who are
level 0 (or unclassified) either do not respond to the sophistication of their opponents or do
so in unpredictable ways. Hence, the proper test of whether subject behavior changes as we
change treatments is to compare the distribution of choices of those subjects who are classified
as being of level 1 or above. This is done in Figure 2 which shows the distribution of choices
in all three treatments for those individuals who are levels 1 and above according to Nagel’s
classification. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the hypothesis that the distribution of
choices of those capable of at least one step of reasoning in the Control treatment is equal to
the distribution of such choices in the Graduate treatment (p = 0.032). Further, both those
distributions are different from the (degenerate) distribution in the Computer treatment
where all subjects capable of one step of reasoning appear as level 1 players (a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test rejects the equality of distributions with p < 0.001 for both cases). This same
result reappears even more dramatically in the Combo treatment where we use a within
subject design and are able to follow individual subjects with high cognitive levels across
treatment manipulations, with results significant at the 1% level (see Result 4).
Our findings above suggest that the observed distribution of levels can be manipulated
by varying the expectations about other players’s cognitive levels.
The Graduate and Computer treatments showed that the observed distribution of cogni-
tive levels can be shifted up or down relative to the Control treatment. Both these treatments
employed a between subject design. In the last treatment (Combo treatment) we use a within
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subject design, which allows us to identify and track the choices of those subjects who are
level 1 or higher.
Result 3: In the Combo treatment, the average choice of subjects decreases as
the number of graduate students increase.
As the proportion of graduate students relative to that of computers in the group in-
creases, the population our undergraduates are playing against is increasing in sophistica-
tion. If our undergraduate subjects believe that, then their choices should decrease. This
is precisely what we observe at the aggregate level, as can be seen in Figure 3. A linear
regression with average choice as the dependent variable and number of graduate students
as the independent one shows that replacing a computer by a graduate student reduces the
average choice by about 1 unit.11
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Figure 3: Average Choice by Number of Graduate Students in the Combo Treatment.
To further analyze the data and see how subjects respond to changes in the population
they face, we use the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004). Accord-
ing to this model, levels of thinking are assumed to be distributed according to a Poisson
distribution with parameter τ .12 Following Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004), we report the
best fitting estimate of τ of the data as well as the 90% confidence interval for τ from a
11The coefficient is −.904, the p-value is smaller than 0.001, while the R2 is 91%.
12The process begins with level zero players, who are assumed to play according to a uniform distribution.
Level k thinkers assume that the other players are distributed according a normalized Poisson distribution
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randomized resampling (with replacement) bootstrap procedure. In Table 5 we present our
results in the Combo treatment for each configuration of computers and graduate students.
Average τ Bootstrap 90% confidence interval
Combo treatment (0c,7g) 30.8 1.62 [1.00, 2.25]
Combo treatment (1c,6g) 32.3 1.44 [1.07, 2.12]
Combo treatment (2c,5g) 33.6 1.30 [.79, 1.69]
Combo treatment (3c,4g) 33.8 1.28 [.99, 1.74]
Combo treatment (4c,3g) 34.3 1.22 [.73, 1.56]
Combo treatment (5c,2g) 34.8 1.16 [.78, 1.43]
Combo treatment (6c,1g) 35.8 1.08 [.98, 1.61]
Combo treatment (7c,0g) 38.6 .81 [.57, 1.42]
Table 5: Estimation of tau in the Combo treatment using model of Camerer, Ho and Chong
(2004).
In the cognitive hierarchy model, τ is a decreasing function of the average. Given that
the average choices decrease as the number of graduate students increase, the τs will go
in the opposite direction, as displayed in Table 5. The more interesting result is that the
90% confidence intervals for τ are moving windows with values generally increasing in the
degree of sophistication of the group the undergraduates are playing against.13 This provides
support for the claim that the decrease in the average choice is not due to outliers, but rather
reflects the choices of a significant part of the population.
These results indicate that on average subjects respond to changes in the composition of
the population they face. The Combo treatment allows us to track individual behavior and
look at how these aggregate results are generated. Result 4 summarizes our findings.
from level zero to level k − 1. Hence they correctly predict the relative frequencies of levels zero through
k − 1, but may incorrectly believe that they are the only player of level k and that there are no players
more sophisticated than they are. The estimation involves finding the value of that minimizes the difference
between the observed sample mean and the mean implied by τ .
13We are using 90% confidence following Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004).
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Result 4: In responding to changes in the composition of groups, subjects can
be classified into two types:
• “Decreasing” types: those who weakly decrease their choices as the proportion of
graduate students in their group goes up, with at least one strictly decreasing choice.
• “Random” types: those who provide non-monotonic responses.
Table 6 presents some summary statistics for these two Random and Decreasing types,
which represents 44.4% and 42.6% of the subjects, respectively. In addition, there are about
3.5% of Increasing types (defined as those who make weakly increasing choices with at least
one strictly increasing choice) and 9.3% of Constant types who kept the same number (on
average 31.6) for each configuration.
Configuration (# computers, # graduate students)
(7c,0g) (6c,1g) (5c,2g) (4c,3g) (3c,4g) (2c,5g) (1c,6g) (0c,7g)
mean 46.4 42.9 42.6 43.6 45.3 46.8 45.9 45.4
Random
(44.4%)
median 47 39.5 41.5 41 46.5 50.5 44 43.5
st. dev. 22.6 16.5 16.2 18.7 16.9 18.8 21.8 22.6
mean 34.3 31.3 29.1 26.8 23.8 21.7 19.2 16.2
Decreasing
(42.6%)
median 33 30 29 25 24 21 18 15
st. dev. 3.21 4.11 4.7 5.7 5.6 6.2 7.3 8.1
Table 6: Summary statistics of choices by type and configuration.
Table 6 shows that even in the (7c, 0g) configuration, in which subjects are faced with
7 computers choosing numbers randomly, Random types fail to choose numbers that would
correspond to level 1 behavior. This suggests that Random types are not capable of even
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one step of reasoning, which puts them into the category of non-strategic players (level
zero).14 Interestingly, in line with the standard assumption on level 0 play, the Random
types average close to 50, as is the case in Agranov, Caplin and Tergiman (2010). On
the contrary, the Decreasing people respond strategically in the (7c, 0g) configuration with
median and average choices of 33 and 34.3, respectively.15 Moreover, as they are faced
with more and more sophisticated population, the mean and the median of the numbers
they choose decrease monotonically. Beyond the monotonicity of answers, there are other
differences in the behavior of the subjects in the Random and Decreasing group. Subjects in
the Random group also make larger changes between their answers for different configurations
with a mean of 16 and a median of 10 compared with the subjects in the Decreasing group,
who average a 2.6 units difference and a median change of 2 units. So, the Random types are
not hovering around a fixed number but rather are changing their choices by large amounts.
Further, over 75% of the subjects in the Random group change the direction of their answers
at least 6 times over the 8 answers that they give in the game.16
As Table 6 indicates, replacing a computer by a graduate student lowers the choice our
undergraduates in the Decreasing group make by about 2.6 units. This implies that they
believe graduate students are on average guessing 14.8. The close-to-linearity in the decrease
of average choices (as the number of graduate students in the group they are playing against
goes up) is an indication that subjects’ beliefs about the choices of the graduate students
is not dependent on how many of them they are playing against. In other words, the
undergraduate students who are part of the Decreasing group believe that graduate students
choose 14.8 on average, and this is true whether they are playing (5c, 2g), (1c, 6g) or any
14In the Combo treatment, about 7.4% of our subjects fit Nagel’s definition of Level 0 players (this is
similar to the proportions in the Graduate, Computer and Control treatments). Thus, Nagel’s definition, by
assuming that level 0 players play between 45 and 50 does not capture those who play randomly over the
support. Our results suggest that the latter type of level 0 represent a larger fraction of those players.
15About 82.6% of the subjects in the Decreasing group choose numbers between 31 and 34 in the (7c, 0g)
configuration, which indicates that these people are at least level 1.
16The fact that this behavior is representative of close to half of the population may help explain why
only little support has been found when experiments are designed to assess the stability of the level-k model
across games, see Georganas, Heally and Weber (2011).
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other configuraion.
Signrank tests confirm what is visually apparent from Table 6: the distribution of answers
for all the pairwise different configurations are no different for the Random types (p > 0.1),
while they are for the Decreasing types (p < 0.001). Consistent with Result 3, our findings
from the Combo treatment indicates almost 50% of subjects are capable of at least one step
of reasoning.
Result 5: The strategy method used in the Combo treatment does not interfere
with the strategic thinking of subjects.
One question that may come to mind is whether the use of the strategy method in
our Combo treatment had an effect on the behavior of our subjects. Since the design of
the Combo treatment contains the Computer and Graduate treatments as a subcases, we
answer this question by comparing the choices made in the Computer and Graduate treat-
ments with that of the (7c, 0g) and (0c, 7g) configurations in the Combo Treatment. Figure
3 presents the histogram of the choices in the Computer and Graduate treatments as well as
the distribution of choices in the Combo treatment with zero and seven graduate students,
respectively. Table 7 presents the summary statistics of the choices observed in these treat-
ments.
Mean Choice Median Choice Std. Dev.
Computer treatment 34.3 33 14.1
(7,0) configuration in Combo treatment 38.6 33 17.2
Graduate treatment 28.6 27 18.9
(0,7) configuration in Combo treatment 30.8 24 21
Table 7: Summary statistics of the Computer, Graduate and Combo treatments with 7
computers and 7 graduates students.
As can be seen from Figure 3 and Table 7, the choices of our subjects in the (7c, 0g)
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Figure 4: Histograms of choices in the Control, Graduate and Combo 0 and 7 graduates
treatments.
configuration in the Combo treatment were close to those in the Computer treatment. A
Ranksum test cannot reject the hypothesis that the distributions of choices are the same
population (p = 0.30).17 Similarly, the distribution of choices in the Graduate treatment
is similar to the one in the (0c, 7g) configuration in the Combo treatment (p = 0.98 in the
Ranksum test).18
17The p-value from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is 0.36.
18Note that since the Combo treatment was run at UBC while the Graduate and Computer treatments
were run at NYU, the fact that there is no difference between the (0c,7g) and the Graduate treatment on
one hand or, between the (7c,0g) and the Computer treatment on the other, also indicates that there is no
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To summarize, the strategy method used in the Combo treatment to elicit subjects’
choices for various configurations of the group they are playing with did not alter the behavior
in any significant way.
4 Conclusions
This paper has attempted to make one simple point that concerns the measurement of
cognitive levels for subjects in games like the two-thirds guessing game. What we have
shown is that the cognitive level chosen by subjects in these games is influenced not only by
their ability to think strategically but also by their beliefs about the abilities of their cohorts.
By manipulating these beliefs we have demonstrated that almost half of the subjects change
their choices in the expected direction. The other half behave non-strategically. These results
show that for a large fraction of the population, cognitive type is endogenously determined
and is a function of a player’s belief about his opponents.
difference in the subject populations in the two universities.
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5 Appendix A: Instructions for the Combo Treatment
Recently, a group of 8 graduate Ph.D. students from the department of Economics at NYU
with training in these types of games played the following game. Each graduate student in
the group chose a number between 0 and 100. That student who was the closest to the 2/3
of the average of all the chosen numbers (including their own) won $10.
Your task
Choose a number between 0 and 100. You will win $10 if your chosen number is closest
to 2/3 times the average of all the chosen numbers of the players in your group.
Your Group
There are 8 members in your group: you plus seven others. The seven other players will
be a mixture of computer players and those graduate students mentioned above.
• Computers. Each of the computers will choose a random number between 0 and 100
with each number being equally likely and with each computer choosing independently
from the others.
• The graduate students. We will randomly select a certain number of responses from
the set of 8 graduate student responses we have (from when they previously played the
game). It is important to note that the responses we randomly choose are from those
choices the graduate students made when they knew they were playing against each
other. They never played against computers and will not be engaged in your decision
problem.
Each of the rows on the sheet below describes the number of computers and graduate
students in your group.
You will now have to choose a number between 0 and 100 for each of these rows. In other
words, you will need to choose a number between 0 and 100 in eight different circumstances
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where the fraction of computer and graduate student choices you are playing against varies
from 0 computer choices and 7 graduate student choices to 7 graduate student choices and
0 computer choices.
Notice that you are not playing against other people in the room. Each of you is playing
against your group, which consists of you, a certain number of computers and a certain num-
ber of graduate students. So, any number of you may win $10. It all depends on your choice
and the choices of the computers and graduate students in the relevant computer/graduate
student group you are in.
To determine your payment, once we collect all the sheets, we will randomly select one
of those rows (using a dice) to “count.” It will be your answer in that row that will matter.
You will win $10 if your chosen number is closest to 2/3 times the average of all the chosen
numbers of the players in your group.
Your Group Your Number
You, 7 computers, 0 graduate students
You, 6 computers, 1 graduate students
You, 5 computers, 2 graduate students
You, 4 computers, 3 graduate students
You, 3 computers, 4 graduate students
You, 2 computers, 5 graduate students
You, 1 computers, 6 graduate students
You, 0 computers, 7 graduate students
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